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ABSTRACT 
 
Due to climate change, small island developing states (SIDS) will experience 
natural hazards, such as hurricanes, with increased frequency and with greater intensity.  
This thesis seeks to provide insight for a case study of SIDS by examining the protocols 
used, awareness of the situation, and preparedness of the country of Dominica during the 
event of Hurricane Maria in September 2017. The study of this island’s response to this 
disaster event serves as an assessment of how well SIDS, particularly those located in the 
Caribbean region, can respond and recover. Through fieldwork, I acquired qualitative 
data using interviews of local individuals. The results suggest that islands have many 
factors that challenge the resilience of island populations.  These challenges are rooted in 
the historical, environmental, political, social, and economic characteristics of the island. 
As a consequence, SIDS will have to address these challenges to emerge as sustainable 
communities.  
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 What are Small Island Developing States (SIDS)? 
Small island developing states (SIDS) are found around the world, yet these 
island communities share many similar characteristics: they are geographically isolated, 
have limited resources, and import resources such as food, fossil fuels and other sources 
of energy. Typically, SIDS have a high dependency on imports, and low numbers of 
exports. There are currently 57 SIDS listed by the United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA) and grouped into three regions: (1) the 
Caribbean Sea; (2) Pacific Ocean; and (3) the Atlantic, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and 
the South China Sea (AIMS) (United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, ).  
Island communities often have small populations, though through development 
these numbers are often steadily increasing.  The overall size of SIDS structures social 
networks: small habitable areas often leads to individuals forming close kinship and 
bonds with each other (Gaillard, 2007; Kelman, 2015; Méheux, Dominey-Howes, & 
Lloyd, 2007a). Their size also means that individuals are closely tied to the availability of 
local resources for subsistence. The individuals of these states have an intimate 
relationship with the land and the sea, echoed in their livelihoods.  
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All SIDS face challenges in susceptibility to natural hazards as well as in 
achieving sustainability in their communities.  SIDS’ communities are often vulnerable to 
tropical cyclones, droughts, earthquakes, some volcanic activity, and storm surges 
(Méheux, Dominey-Howes, & Lloyd, 2007b; Mimura et al., 2007) The impacts of natural 
hazards are particular problematic for small islands given their limited local resources. 
Thus, exposure to natural hazards has the ability to dramatically shape the structure of 
communities.  
 
Figure 1 SIDS Map En. Osiris[Map]. (2013, January 2). Retrieved from 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SIDS_map_en.svg 
 
1.2 Literary Review 
1.2.1 IPCC predicts high risk of impacts for small islands. 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change studies the effects of climate 
change and whose published findings influence international governments and 
policymakers (Barry & Frankland, 2014; IPCC, 2013). The results of the panel’s findings 
show that there is high confidence that climate change will severely impact small islands. 
The IPCC suggests that the consequences are so severe that social and political changes 
will have to be made to deal with the degree of impacts (Barry & Frankland, 2014). For 
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instance, sea level rise threatens the existence of some SIDS within the region of the 
Pacific. The political changes as significant as full evacuations of these states will be 
required, socially changing the livelihoods of the islanders (Kelman, 2015).  
“Current and future climate-related drivers of risk for small islands during the 21st 
century include sea level rise (SLR), tropical and extratropical cyclones, increasing 
air and sea surface temperatures, and changing rainfall patterns (high confidence; 
robust evidence, high agreement)”.  
 
- Chapter 29: Small islands. Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 
and Vulnerability. 5th Assessment Report from IPCC (Mimura et al., 
2007) 
 
1.2.2 Local voices provide insight into challenges faced by communities 
To reduce impacts, guidelines from other countries such as the United States, 
should not be used for SIDS. Islands require policies and governance guidelines that are 
specific to their characteristics. Kelman (2010), for example, claims that local voices 
within communities provide the best insights into people’s interests, desires, and 
perceptions (Kelman, 2010).  Kelman argues that island governance towards hazards 
should incorporate community-based knowledge for islands’ survival. His argument 
stems from the fact that islands, especially those that have indigenous peoples, have used 
techniques that have worked, allowing their inhabitants to survive until today. He 
acknowledges that climate change carries uncertainties to which traditional local 
knowledge alone cannot guarantee survival, but still thinks that it a weapon that is 
underutilized. 
To reduce impacts, blanket policies from other countries, such as the United 
States, should not be used for SIDS. Islands require policies and governance guidelines 
that are specific to their characteristics. Kelman (2010), for example, claims that local 
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voices within communities provide the best insights into people’s interests, desires, and 
perceptions (Kelman, 2010).  Kelman argues that island governance towards hazards 
should incorporate community-based knowledge in order for islands’ survival. His 
argument stems from the fact that islands, especially those that have indigenous peoples, 
have used techniques that have worked, allowing their inhabitants to survive until today. 
He acknowledges that climate change carries uncertainties to which traditional local 
knowledge alone cannot guarantee survival, but still thinks that it a weapon that is 
underutilized. 
    Others agree that research is needed at the community level to obtain local knowledge 
and insight. Méheux, Dominic-Howes, and Lloyd (2007) have written about the reasons 
that there should be future research of island communities and natural hazards. They 
explicitly say that it is a good idea for smaller-scale research – especially at the 
community level. They state that larger nations who scientists consider to be more 
responsible for the increasing climate change will not focus on research and development 
for SIDS because those effects that affect SIDS are not considered a threat to them 
(Méheux et al., 2007). This topic joins the fuller discussion about climate justice, which 
states that nations responsible for climate change should be the ones that look to reduce 
the impacts felt by those who are most vulnerable to climate change. In this case, it is 
SIDS (Baptiste & Rhiney, 2016a; Scobie, 2018). Furthermore, these authors believe that 
researching the relationship between natural hazards and SIDS can encourage, not only 
disaster mitigation, but also sustainable development planning initiatives which can 
support island livelihoods. Méheux, Dominic-Howes, and Lloyd’s article (2007) then 
conclude with a recommendation of smaller-scale studies, at the community level, which 
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identifies impacts from natural hazards, as well as weaknesses in the existing protocols, 
but comprehension of best practices of response and recovery of island communities 
(Méheux et al., 2007; Scobie, 2018).(Kelman, 2010)(Méheux et al., 2007)(Baptiste & 
Rhiney, 2016; Scobie, 2018)(Scobie, 2018) 
1.2.2.1 The Components of Emergency Management 
The realm of response and recovery is closely related to the operations of 
emergency management. Emergency management is the framework that operates to 
reduce vulnerability to hazards and reconstruct areas throughout a disaster crisis. It has 
four main phases: (1) Mitigation, (2) Preparedness, (3) Response and (4) Recovery. 
These four, in addition to communication, are considered disciplines of efficient 
emergency management systems widely adopted around the world in moments of 
disaster.  In relevance to this study, I will review two of these disciplines to understand 
the protocols, awareness, and preparedness of my case study area.  
1.2.2.1.1 Preparedness  
Preparedness is a systematic approach which includes assessing vulnerabilities 
and risks of people or places. The assessment part of preparedness identifies shortfalls 
that can decrease the capability to respond and recover from hazards or disasters. 
Preparedness is manifested by the individual, community, business, governmental, or 
non-governmental groups (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  Actions involved with 
preparedness is needed for the survival of economic, social, and ecological systems. 
Preparedness assesses the current capability of a community to respond and 
recover to emergency situations or disasters. There are four components of preparedness: 
planning, training, exercises, and equipment.  Planning involves scoping vulnerabilities 
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or threats. This scoping provides information about the threat for which one is preparing. 
Training involves the education involved with managing oneself and others during a 
crisis. Preparing elected officials, emergency managers, and the public require training. 
Exercising involves simulations of potentially hazardous events and identifying the 
shortfalls that can lead to a decreased chance of surviving the event.  These exercises 
include drills and full-scale simulations of natural disasters. Equipment consists of the 
availability, operating, and upkeep of supplemental components that are deemed to be 
useful during an emergency. Equipment includes communicative devices, vehicles, and 
scientific instruments. 
Most entities have an emergency operation plan that spells out the process for 
preparation. For countries, often a national response framework is developed. The plan 
includes the base plan, the functional, situational, and hazards annexes (Haddow et al., 
2017). The basic plan is the complete operational guide but, annexes provide more depth 
into the responsibilities and roles of each function for each situation or hazard (Goss, 
1996). 
The public’s preparedness begins with education and training.  Community 
emergency response teams (CERT) have been successfully developed within the United 
States. CERT programs teach people within communities how to take control and help 
one another during an emergency situation when official response teams might be 
overwhelmed or not able to respond effectively. These programs provide facts about 
potential disasters, life-saving and decision-making skills, and how to organize into teams 
during an emergency situation(Haddow et al., 2017). 
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1.2.2.1.2 Communication 
Communication during an emergency event is important because it enhances the 
probability of efficient response and recovery from hazards. “The mission of an effective 
disaster communications strategy is to provide timely and accurate information to the 
public in all four phases of emergency management…” (Haddow et al., 2017, 
p.134)(Haddow et al., 2017).  Mitigation are the strategies adopted that can reduce the 
loss of lives or properties. Communicating preparedness involves transmitting 
information to the public. Response and recovery involve developing warnings and 
updates about an ongoing disaster then letting the public know where to get help.  
Haddow and colleagues (2017) state that contemporary varieties of media are an 
effective way to communicate about hazards and disasters because it allows transparency.  
Internet-enabled cell phones, tablets, laptops, and digital cameras allow citizens to the 
display the frontline conditions of the emergencies as well as televisions and radios. Due 
to the value of media in the context of a disaster, a partnership should be forged between 
social media outlets and emergency managers /operators so that information can 
efficiently be transmitted to the community. Communication can also be aided by local 
networks within the community-based groups that can spread messages along. 
One crucial aspect of communication is the messenger chosen to deliver official 
messages.  The messenger who communicates to the public should be someone who has a 
critical role in the disaster response operations to enable public trust in the correct 
operation. Elected official and emergency managers must be openly seen by the public so 
that all are aware that information is coming from someone who has the authority and can 
make decisions (Haddow et al., 2017). 
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1.2.3 Local voices provide insight into challenges faced by communities 
To reduce impacts, blanket guidelines from other areas of the world such as the 
U.S., should not be used for SIDS. Islands require policies and governance guidelines 
that are specific to their characteristics. Kelman (2010), for example, claims that local 
voices within communities provide the best insights into people’s interests, desires, and 
perceptions(Kelman, 2010).  Kelman argues that island governance towards hazards 
should incorporate community-based knowledge in order for islands’ survival. His 
argument stems from the fact that islands, especially those that have indigenous peoples, 
have used techniques that have worked, allowing their inhabitants to survive until today. 
He acknowledges that climate change carries uncertainties to which traditional local 
knowledge alone cannot guarantee survival, but still thinks that it a weapon that is 
underutilized. 
 Others agree that research is needed at the community level to obtain local 
knowledge and insight. Méheux, Dominic-Howes, and Lloyd (2007) have written about 
the reasons that there should be future research of island communities and natural 
hazards. They explicitly say that it is a good idea for smaller-scale research – specifically 
at the community level. They state that larger nations who scientists consider to be more 
responsible for the increasing climate change will not focus on research and development 
for SIDS because those effects that affect SIDS are not considered a threat to them 
(Méheux et al., 2007). This is included in the fuller discussion about climate justice, 
which states that nations responsible for climate change should be the ones that look to 
reduce the impacts felt by those who are most vulnerable to climate change. In this case it 
is SIDS (Baptiste & Rhiney, 2016b). In addition, these authors believe that researching 
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the relationship between natural hazards and SIDS can encouraged, not only disaster 
mitigation, but also sustainable development planning initiatives which can support 
island livelihoods. Méheux, Dominic-Howes, and Lloyd’s article (2007) then concludes 
with a recommendation of smaller-scale studies, at the community level, which identify 
impacts from natural hazards, as well as weaknesses in the existing protocols, but a 
comprehension of best practices of response of recovery of island communities (Scobie, 
2018). 
1.3 Research Question: How have SIDS responded to threats from Natural 
Hazards? 
As stated, small islands are expected to endure harsh impacts from natural hazards 
that will increase in intensity and frequency. SIDS' environmental and economic 
characteristics have the potential to make these natural hazards turn into disasters. I 
believe that there must be a review of the present catastrophe protocols and preparation of 
SIDS before implementing new climate change and risk mitigation policies and 
recommendations. I would like to examine how SIDS perceive their risk and resilience 
towards disasters and natural hazards, moreover their awareness of their situation.  
Hence, my research question has three separate lines of inquiry: (1) If SIDS are 
threatened continuously by these natural hazards, do they have protocols in place that can 
reduce their risk? (2) Are they even aware of their vulnerability? (3) Are they prepared 
for natural disasters?  
Cataloging current or previous actions taken by islanders on the individual and 
governmental level during a natural disaster event would be the first step to addressing 
these questions. The island of Dominica, located in the Caribbean, is one of the 57 
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countries classified as a SIDS. On September 18th, 2017, the island had experienced a 
catastrophic event, the landfall of Hurricane Maria. The storm hit the island as a category 
five on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale.  The topography of the island endured hours 
of 160 miles per hours winds and heavy rainfall.  
This event on this island is an unfortunate, but perfect case study to answer my 
research question. Thus, my thesis is an assessment of the protocol, awareness, and 
preparedness of the island of Dominica before, during, and after Hurricane Maria in 
September 2017.   
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2 Chapter Two: The Case Study 
2.1 The island of Dominica 
 The island of Dominica is located in the Caribbean Sea, lying in the Lesser 
Antilles archipelago, between Guadeloupe to the north and Martinique to the south. 
Officially named the Commonwealth of Dominica, the island is a former colonized state 
of both England and France, eventually gaining its independence from the United 
Kingdom’s dominion on November 3rd, 1978.  
Rightfully called Waitu’kubuli meaning “tall is her body” by the island’s indigenous 
Kalinago Caribs, Dominica is topographically mountainous-volcanic terrain. Its tallest 
mountain is Morne Diablotin, with a peak that is 4,747 feet (1,447 meters). 70% of the 
island is mountains, leaving a small fraction of land that is suitable for cultivation that 
supports a society of 70,000.  
Nicknamed “the nature island,” its full 290 square miles host 365 rivers, nine 
volcanoes, including Boiling Lake (that is the world’s second-largest hot spring), and a 
diversity of flora and fauna. The interior tropical rainforest sees over 300 inches of 
rainfall a year while the coasts see only about 50 inches. On the island, the hurricane 
season falls from June to November.  
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2.2 Hurricane Maria and Dominica 
Tropical waves off the coast of Africa were first reported on September 12th, 
2017. By Saturday, September 16th, a tropical storm watch had been made for four 
Leeward islands including Dominica. At 1500 UTC (3 PM), the National Hurricane 
Center in Miami, Florida had sent out a forecast advisory titled “POTENTIAL 
TROPICAL CYCLONE FIFTEEN FORECAST/ADVISORY NUMBER 1” stating that 
the storm was to develop into a tropical storm within the next 48 hours (National 
Hurricane Center, 2017). The first public advisories arrived earlier that day, around 11 
AM Atlantic Standard Time. By 2 PM Atlantic Standard Time (AST), the storm was 
named Maria. By this time, some islands were under a hurricane watch and others, 
including Dominica, were still listed under a tropical storm watch. By 8 PM, a public 
advisory from the National Hurricane Center showed that the Government of France had 
issued a hurricane watch for the island of Guadeloupe to the north. Dominica was still 
under a tropical storm watch until the “Tropical Storm Maria Advisory Number 4” at 5 
AM Atlantic Standard time on September 17th, 2017 (National Hurricane Center, 2017). 
In that advisory, the National Hurricane Center announce that, “the government of 
Barbados has changed the Tropical Storm Watch for Dominica to a Hurricane Watch.” 
 At 9 PM AST, September 18th, 2017, Maria had made landfall on the island of 
Dominica with maximum sustained winds up to 160 mph (Government of the 
Commonwealth of Dominica, 2017) . The Saffir-Simpson scale depicts that at that wind 
speed: “Catastrophic damage will occur…A high percentage of framed homes will be 
destroyed, with total roof failure and wall collapse. Fallen trees and power poles will 
isolate residential areas. Power outages will last for weeks to possibly months. Most of 
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the area will be uninhabitable for weeks or months” (Schott et al., 2012)That was exactly 
what happened, along with flashfloods and landslides. Roads were completely blocked 
off, and most homes were sighted as just their foundations.  It is recorded that the island 
experienced 22.8 inches of rainfall. 90% of the roofs had considerable damage. 31 people 
were pronounced dead, with 37 were reported missing. It is estimated that the damages 
will cost the island $1.37 billion. (Assessment Capacities Project, 2018). The following 
figure (Pasch, Penny, & Berg, 2018) and photographs below depict the hurricane path 
and the damage that it caused to the island.  
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Figure 2 The full path of Hurricane Maria from September with colored lines represent intensity in 
the Caribbean region. 
Magenta signifies that it had strength of a category 5 and 4 on the Saffir-Simpson Scale. Red is 
category 3 and lower on the scale. Yellow and green show Maria as tropical disturbances in the 
weather. The closeup insert shows Maria passes over two islands: Dominica and Puerto Rico at high 
pressure and wind speed. Captioned “Best track positions for Hurricane Maria, 16–30 September 
2017. Track during the extratropical stage is partially based on analyses from the NOAA Ocean 
Prediction Center.” Hurricane Maria 16-30 September 2017[Map]. Pasch et. al, (2018) 
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL152017_Maria.pdf 
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Photographs 1 (top) and 2 (bottom) -  Heavy rainfall caused landslide. These images show a large boulder 
blocking the main road that connects the northeast of the country to the capital of Roseau. Communication 
efforts become troubled when the only way to and from the certain areas of the country is compromised. 
The size of the boulder can be scaled to reference by the people standing in the photos. The water pictured 
is the Caribbean Sea. These images were taken a month after Maria made landfall and depict the difficulty 
of recovering to damage. Source: Used with permission of photographer, Anthony Lawrence  October 
26, 2017. 
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Photographs 3 (top) and 4 (bottom) – Houses had considerable damage. These images show the amount of 
damage caused by powerful winds and rainfall. Hurricane Maria was able to rip the roofs and walls off of 
90% of the houses in Dominica. Many homes were left with just their foundations (top). Streets were 
littered with debris and left there for months after (bottom). Many islanders will have to build their homes 
from scratch during the recovery period. Source: Used with permission of photographer, Anthony 
Lawrence  October 22, 2017. 
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Photographs 5 (top) and 6 (bottom) – River communities were exposed to more danger. Most communities 
are most likely to be in close quarters of one of the 365 rivers within Dominica. Heavy rainfall dumped in 
the watersheds of the mountains during the Maria caused rivers, tributaries, and streams to increase in flow. 
It also sent large pieces of debris and trees to slow downstream. This natural phenomenon threatened 
riparian communities to experience land subsidence, flooding, and mudslides.  Source: Used with 
permission of photographer, Anthony Lawrence   October 22, 2017. 
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2.3 Hurricane David and Dominica 
 Hurricane Maria was not the first of its magnitude to be experienced by the island 
of Dominica. On August 29th, 1979, Category 4 Hurricane David made a direct path over 
the southern part of the country. That area, which included the capital of Roseau, felt 
colossal damage from the maximum sustained winds of 125 knots (143 mph). The island 
experienced a great loss of the crops of their biggest exports at the time, bananas and 
coconuts. The storm is on record as dumping 10 inches of added rainfall to the island’s 
interior resulting in landslides and flooding in some areas. It is archived that David 
damaged approximately 80% of the homes. About 60,000 people were left homeless, 
which was nearly 80% of the total population of the island at that time. 56 people died 
and 180 were injured.  The observation of the neighborhoods on the island is likened to 
devastation after an air raid (Hebert, 1980).  
 
2.4 Differences between Hurricanes David (1979) and Maria (2018) 
Firstly, the path of the eye of David was through the middle of the south of the 
island. Maria’s eye path was straight through the center of the island. During the recovery 
period of David, the north was able to carry on business as usual quicker and supply help 
to the south of the island. Secondly, David crossed over the island in the daytime during 
the middle of the week, which meant that people were more likely to get supplies and 
prepare themselves for the upcoming storm starting Monday during usual business hours. 
Maria’s full force appeared during a Sunday night when most people were already 
indoors, and shopping for supplies was tough due to weekend business hours. Lastly, 
David was said to produce more damage by wind while Maria was described as a “wet” 
storm, meaning it had more water-related costs on top of massive wind damage. 
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3 Chapter Three: Methods  
In order to examine a case in which SIDS responded to threats from natural hazards, 
I narrowed the geographic area to the island of Dominica. To assess Dominica’s capacity, 
I recruited 15 participants for interviews. I chose these individuals using the snowballing 
sampling technique in which one initial participant was used as a basis for recruiting 
other participants in the sample. All 15 participants had lived on the island of Dominica 
for most of their lives. 14 out of 15 participants have livelihoods within the country’s 
capital of Roseau. Their occupations and careers varied (Table 1). 
Table 1 Breakdown of Participants' Occupations 
Economic Sector # of Participants (n=15) 
Agriculture 1 
Community Development 3 
Education 3 
Law Enforcement 2 
Public Administration 3 
Religion 1 
Tourism 2 
 
Only one participant was not present on the island when Hurricane Maria made 
landfall. The 14 others were on the island frm September 16 -20, 2017, during Hurricane 
Maria. The remaining participant was in the vicinity of the Caribbean and returned to the 
island during the recovery period. All 15 participants have some knowledge of the 
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characteristics of the response and recovery efforts during and after Hurricane David in 
1979.   
I conducted interviews over the telephone and in person. These interviews were 
conducted after review by Binghamton University’s institutional review board (IRB) for 
interacting with human subjects. This study established each participants’ full consent, 
given verbally, recorded with a mobile phone application. Identifying characteristics of 
the participants such as names were not documented. Instead, general occupational 
identifiers were given for analysis and organization of this study.  
I formulated interview questions using the literature as well as news reports in the 
immediate aftermath of Hurricane Maria. I organized these questions into six focus areas: 
(1) communication; (2) community vs. institutional actions; (3) community knowledge; 
(4) security (and the action of looting); (5) social justice; and (6) resiliency. Questions for 
each of these focus areas in unification help piece together an assessment of the 
protocols, awareness, and preparedness of the island of Dominica during Hurricane 
Maria. 
I scheduled each interview for 25 minutes, in which participants relayed answers 
to the questions. Interviews were recorded with a mobile phone application. Recorded 
interviews amounted to 13 hours, 52 minutes, and 15 seconds in total. Only one 
participant did not give permission for their interview to be recorded. That interview was 
approximately 15 minutes. 
There were multiple limitations to this study. One was finding documents from 
the island of Dominica, which does not have a comprehensive official database. Materials 
online are limited to those documents, laws, and news reports that are digitized and 
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accessible online. Another limitation of this study is that research was conducted five 
months after a catastrophe, so assessments of this report were compiled while recovery 
efforts were ongoing. Finding supplementary resources as well as a larger sample for the 
study was made harder by the catastrophe. Telecommunication was also problematic. 
Since the island was experiencing problems with electricity, cold calling certain people to 
ask if they would like to be interviewed proved difficult. 
It is understood that the Snowball technique for creating a sample of participants 
poses a problem in controlling for a plethora of like-minded individuals. To control for 
this while retaining variance in the sample, I asked two participants who gave me 
contrasting answers to the study’s questions to recommend and recruit other potential 
participants that they knew. The small number of the sample is recognized.  
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4 Chapter Four: Results of the Study 
Answers to the interview questions are summarized below. All of the responses that I 
acquired were coded for content and analyzed into  six focus areas described in the 
previous section.  
4.1 Communication 
4.1.1 Medium and accuracy 
Participants said they were accustomed to following messages announced on the 
national broadcasting radio stations and television weather channels. 70% of respondents 
all mentioned two mediums by name: Dominica Broadcasting Station (DBS) and the 
Weather Channel. Through these means, all the participants said they were aware of an 
upcoming storm within the region. Everyone said they were tracking the storm for 
multiple days before it made its path towards Dominica.  
 
4.1.2 Timing 
Every participant believed that each time an alert or update was issued was 
extremely important. On average, updates about a tropical cyclone is given every 6 hours 
by the National Hurricane Center. This time includes a reconnaissance aircraft to fly into 
the storm and collect information such as position and wind speed. They then use this 
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information to calculate a “best track,” plotting a path showing 6-hour intervals. In the 
case of Maria, any 6-hour update felt more like a delay. This storm was moving at such a 
fast pace that new incoming information was inaccurate. Public advisories by the 
National Hurricane Center were given every three hours after September 16th, and after 
5PM September 18th, updates were given every few minutes, according to the center’s 
Hurricane Maria Advisory Archive (Landsea & Lawrence, 2004).  
 
4.1.3 Messages Communicated by Non-Experts 
Participants concurred that information about the upcoming storm was provided by a 
mixture of people. Most of the participants said that the messages over the radio were 
given by radio personalities and national officials. This means the message of hurricane 
safety and updates about the storm was not given by weather experts or meteorologists. 
As suggested by The Introduction to Emergency Management handbook, the messenger 
is important. The sense of urgency about the storm was not given since the information 
was provided neither by someone who understands the science nor by someone of 
authority in emergency situations who could effectively present the harsh and honest 
depiction of what was to be expected in a way the general public would understand.  
One participant suggested that the radio dialogue was “too jargon-y and needed 
layman’s language on the radio.” That same participant felt that communication generally 
could have been “more on the ground” and also “…[given] in Kwéyòl.”1 
 
                                               
1 Kwéyòl is an additional language that is spoken on the island besides the official language of English. It is 
a French-based Patois, tied to the history and culture of the plantation slaves in the earlier 17th and 18th 
centuries; bits and pieces can be heard in everyday conversations (Government of Dominica, 2018) 
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4.1.4 Social Media and Rumors 
People used cellphones and tablets to browse social media platforms for information 
about the storms as well as radio and television. Information on social media can be false, 
edited, or not updated altogether. Rumors—or unverified, distortions of information—are 
problematic when ecological and human safety are at stake for accurate and timely 
information.  
“WhatsApp, Facebook, Instagram. That is just the mode of the day. 
Easiest form. Everyone has a cell phone.” 
 
4.1.5 Frequency of storms lowered seriousness of situation 
 Maria was a storm that followed many Atlantic storms that hurricane season. On 
average, six hurricanes develop a year. Complacency may occur when the island 
community is exposed to natural hazards repeatedly (Pelling & Uitto, 2001; Sheets, 
1990) . People’s individual response to warnings, watches, and updates are then 
situational based on perception. A few participants said that others anticipated their 
survival by either claiming they could get through Maria since they had already 
gotten through David, or by using religious preconception, such as “it’s God’s will”. 
The majority of the island follows some version of Christianity (Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 2017). 
“Everyone said ‘I survived that David, I can survive this’ pre-Maria, 
and prepared as normal. After they said, ‘This is nothing like 
David’.” 
 
4.2 Community Actions vs Institutional Actions 
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4.2.1 Recognized lead agency and official disaster plan 
Everyone interviewed named the ODM as the lead agency during emergency 
situations. According to the 2001 National Disaster Plan, the National Emergency 
Planning Organization (NEPO), chaired by the PM, is technically the lead agency, whose 
job it is to oversee a National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC). It is stated in the 
plan that authority is then passed on to the ODM, which is why the ODM is perceived as 
the lead agency (National Emergency Planning Organization, 2001). However, the 
authorities and boundaries are not sufficiently explained such that it is not clear if the 
ODM has the explicit authority to make executive decisions in an emergency situation.  
 
Photograph 7 -  The Office of Disaster Management, located in the town of Jimmit, Mahaut, 
Dominica. The ODM is the island’s listed emergency management operation agency. They are 
required by to operate a National Emergency Operations Center by law. Source: Author 
“ODM has responsibilities but no authority. No law to give them 
power.”  
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4.2.2 Delegation of tasks 
It seems as though the delegation of tasks were given out flippantly by the PM 
and other executive officials and consequently, people felt like there they saw more of the 
PM than the ODM. They knew efforts were being made by the ODM, but it was not seen 
as on the ground, controlling the situation.  
“PM more visible… ODM kind of got lost in the hours and days 
after.” 
 
4.2.3 Community members possess same qualities and resources as leading 
agencies 
Participants said that these key leaders could just as easily have distributed materials and 
resources, offered their equipment, and volunteered their manpower and life-saving 
skills. People sensed there could have been more delegation and responsibilities given to 
key community leaders and shelter managers during the event. Some pronounced that 
community members went as far as housing those who were displaced. 
“Key leaders in the community would help…distribute resources”. 
 
4.3 Community Knowledge 
4.3.1 Parents instilled survival and communities shared knowledge 
All participants said they were taught by family members about what to do during a 
hurricane. Many more added that their communities were the ones that taught them 
additional knowledge. Together, they felt as though the neighbors watched over the 
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survival of others, which was essential for preparedness and the key to successful 
response and recovery. 
“My father taught me things at home. What to do before the 
hurricane season, so on and so forth. And then I watched the 
different families on our street do the same thing. I watched parents 
talk about who has what… they kind of used to do inventories of who 
has what tools… My father was the keeper of that. Other people 
had… like a neighbor, he was into radio… So, they knew what the 
strengths of each other was, so they didn’t have to be searching… If 
someone was cut, we knew where the nurse was. We didn’t have to 
search or wait around for the hospitals…That’s the power of local 
knowledge. 
 
4.3.2 No drills in school 
Most of the participants said that they do recall learning about climate and extreme 
changes in weather but never how to respond to hurricanes. It was mentioned that the 
Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA) sometimes host 
workshops for children within the months before and during the summer months. Some 
said that as adults, having drills depended on the workplace but still nothing was truly 
mandatory. 
“They hardly had drills.” 
 
4.3.3 Past generations versus new generations 
It was expressed that generations differed in survival preparedness.  Unprepared older 
generations were said to have justified their lax preparation due to the fact that they had 
survived Hurricane David. Some believed the majority of the newer generations 
(referencing young parents) were busy with occupations and white-collar careers, so they 
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did not show their children mitigative techniques as was done in previous generations. 
They expressed that the value of “koudmen” was missing (Crosbie, Frank, Leon, & 
Samuel, 2001) . Koudmen is a Kwéyòl word that means a help, free work day, or a group 
work project. The word was expressed multiple times in the interviews. Participants said 
that people were not as willing to lend a helping hand in the neighborhood. Their 
reasoning was that the society of younger generations are exposed to new gadgets, 
technology and a global economy. It was considered that the children of the island were 
more excited to see the event of the storm than be prepared and take it as a serious life-
threatening event.  
 
4.4 Security (and the action of looting) 
4.4.1 Burglary of non-survival items  
People looting non-essential items angered many of the participants. Many of them 
identified the island’s youth as people who made looting into a political, economic, and 
social protest instead of it being about survival. Participants said that they saw looters 
break into buildings and offices and take items needed for businesses. Such items 
included bulky household items like furniture and appliances, office equipment, and 
computer systems. The participants said that the behavior should not have been accepted 
as looting, but as stealing, which is a punishable crime. 
“On the other hand, I saw people carrying fridges and stoves… I saw 
them stacked at their house… I saw stacks of washing machines in 
cardboard boxes untouched in their front yard…This is looting, and 
this is unforgiveable, and this is wrong, and I condemn it to the 
highest degree. A man feeding his family and he comes to a business 
place and he take some sugar and some rice and some flour, milk… 
and he brings it to his family. I don’t call that looting.” 
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Photograph 8 -  Burglary masked as looting. This image shows a solar street lamp whose battery and 
transformer has been taken. These street lamps are property of the island’s government and spread 
throughout the coastline. It was believed that the battery was stolen from the base of the lamp, which 
was secured with concrete and bolts, as shown in the picture. Survivors needed special tools to open 
that compartment. The solar battery and transformer produces electricity. Source: Author 
 
4.4.2 Impact of looting and burglary 
The participants were afraid that the looting incident was going to cause economic 
instability. They explained that businesses and offices left unscathed by the hurricane 
were broken into, and valuable items were destroyed or stolen.  Many of them blamed 
this action on uncertainties of the Dominican economy and job market. Most believed 
that certain industries like tourism and agriculture will not recover. They said that 
unemployment before the hurricane was already a pressing issue in society, and the 
actions of looters exacerbated it. They highly believed that those who are unemployed 
will leave the island, and a large migration of residents will lead to less productivity, thus 
a continued cycle of crime within society. They further predicted that a large emigration 
will cause businesses to hike up prices of items for customers.  Scarcity of food and 
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building materials for homes, as well as higher taxes, are feared results of an unstable 
market.   
Participants said there would be a loss of trust in youth. They revealed that they do 
not believe the youth will bring positive change. They fear losing a sense of community. 
Some said they were afraid to leave their homes in case someone tried to steal from them. 
Some feared being murdered. All participants said that the social well-being of survivors 
of the hurricanes will be affected. Depression and other psychosocial emotions were 
mentioned to be highly rampant within society because of the mass trauma caused by the 
hurricane and looting situation. 
 
4.4.3 Looting rooted in political reasons regarding economic and social issues  
Participants tried to explain the anger of the youth. In some way or another, all 15 
participants hinted at the government being responsible for creating feelings of alienation 
and injustice among the younger generation. They explained it as young adults taking 
what they believed should have been provided to them through government programs. It 
was not necessarily that economic advantages are not given to people of the island, but 
that some get more than others. Favoritism by the government for its political supporters 
was mentioned frequently in the interviews. Participants said that it was a major problem 
for the island by exposing their personal experiences. However, this should not be 
considered as definitive proof. The true extent of partisanship is very difficult to prove 
based on personal experiences from a limited sample size, and so this tension is not 
further explored in the study. 
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“This is not an issue about law enforcement. To me, this is an issue 
about national rage.  This is about people being upset about the time. 
This is about the last days. People feeling, again, this ‘Pray to God 
and he will save you from the hurricane’ moment and you are not 
saved. This is about a rage of economic disparity. Access to things. It 
has everything to do with an economic and social reality. About 
economic difference and inequality. So, to frame looting as problem 
of security is to miss the point… It is a direct result of the culture of 
dependency…And this was a way of enacting, them saying ‘Waiting 
for people to take care of me didn’t work. I’m going to take 
something for myself…. I’m so frustrated.’” 
 
4.4.4 Law enforcement was overwhelmed  
The main period of looting was cited as lasting 5-6 days. People were concerned 
about why the police took so long to act. Participants said that security was an 
overwhelming task for law enforcement. It was explained that there is no military force in 
Dominica. According to the Police Act Chapter 14:01, the police force shall be employed 
as a military force “in defense of the State” (Government of Dominica, 1991; Red de 
Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina, 2010). This happened in the case of Hurricane 
Maria. The police force was called to action during the storm and immediately after. 
Some participants said infrastructural damages based on the magnitude and destruction of 
the storm, such as blocked roads, weakened the capacity of law enforcement to act 
efficiently. Some participants also recognized that the police force might have been 
worrying about their families and homes, distracting them from acting quickly to 
situations. One participant said that it was unacceptable for this to be an excuse when it 
came to the looting.  
It was mentioned that there was a lack of police leadership. This entailed that there 
was a lack of clear instructions, and the police force did not want to act towards looters in 
a way that would have created future lawsuits. Additionally, there was the fact that the 
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police force recognized the looters as people of their own communities or even family 
members. External military forces from other countries helping with recovery efforts do 
not have the mindset that looters are people they are close to. This enabled these forces to 
take more brute actions towards looters.  
Many also said the state of emergency was declared too late. Curfews were not issued 
or enforced until days after the storm. Participants believed that this would have 
controlled the situation better.  
 
Photograph 9 – Pictured are external forces coming from the sea to villages and communities cut 
off from the rest of the island. Source: Used with permission of photographer, Anthony Lawrence   
“You have a responsibility when you belong to an organization like 
that to maintain law and order at any cost. And I don’t think they 
were prepared either for that level of disaster… When it came to 
implementation, the reality, there was a complete breakdown of 
security… Even the looters… The Jamaicans [forces] were the ones 
shooting people in their foot because the local policemen said they 
weren’t shooting anybody… everybody in Dominica related…what 
happens when you see your cousin looting?... So that is something 
that has to be looked at because if this happens again, what do we 
do? …They were totally overwhelmed and overstretched.”  
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4.5 Social Justice 
When asked if anyone was left out of potential resiliency plans, various groups 
were named, including the unemployed, displaced, aging, and children. These groups 
were considered to be the most vulnerable because they either had no money or were not 
educated enough on how to change their lifestyles to support resilience.  
“The other thing about hurricanes is that you receive the advice…  
both at the farm level and household level, it is a financial issue, 
whether or not the individual has the capacity to do what needs to be 
done… I think that at the individual level that is a major setback. 
People know what to do but they might not be in a position to do it.” 
 
 
Photograph 10 – Hurricane Ties. This image shows the use of hurricane ties (the black twisted 
materials on the wooden beams) on the roof of the Fort Young Hotel in Roseau. They are used to 
secure the roof if heavy wind is threatening to uplift it. A participant acknowledged that they were 
unaware that this was a tool they can install in their own house before a hurricane until they 
discovered it in someone else’s home and asked about it. They described it as a pricey material and 
that it can be unaffordable to have a contractor install it in other’s homes. This scenario shows how 
knowledge can be spread through the community level and how advice is given but individuals are not 
always able to follow it. Source: Author 
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4.5.1 Men and the working poor 
Two answers were particularly interesting: men and the working poor. The 
reasons that these two were left out can be explained by the direct quotes below.  
“But everything in response to Maria and even before Maria has to 
do with women. Single women. Single mother. Women with children 
under 12 [years of age]. What about the men? The whole packaging 
of everything has kind of sidelined the men… in a systematic way…. 
Be equitable. Be gender non-biased… There is a disparity. And we 
are underestimating the impact of this in the overall resilience of the 
society.” 
“I say [the working poor] are left out because they cannot move from 
where they are. They are fixed. They are immobile…economically… 
materially…. This is not people who are sitting out there waiting for a 
handout. Necessarily, they are not on the block, but certainly have 
some social problems created by exhaustion…. Making sure they 
meet the needs of their family. There are so many families like this 
who get left out because they are not poor enough… Some of them 
are literally starting over from scratch.” 
 
4.6 Resiliency 
 
4.6.1 Resiliency believed to lie in the hands of agriculture and tourism 
As with previous generations, the livelihoods of the people are heavily dependent 
on the land and sea of and around the island, in the forms of agriculture and tourism. It 
would be very devastating for society if people were unable to go back to those sectors in 
which their livelihoods prospered and make these feel as though they never recovered 
from Hurricane Maria. This has everything to do with identity and sense of place. 
Agriculture and tourism are not necessarily the only ways of getting communities back to 
how they were before the storm but are ways for people of the island to begin feeling 
optimistic for the future. Other proponents of this question say that they would like 
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sustainability and resilience to be continued topics of conversation for many years to 
come. They would like to see Government and government officials to promise to 
maintain these conversations, to enforce sustainable practices and protocols, and meet 
sustainable goals. They would like to see Dominica be the first island community and 
Caribbean SID to reach a level of resilience that other SIDS look towards for precedents, 
inspiration, courage, and strength.  
“We cannot move the beach.” 
  
 
Photograph 11 – This image shows how close the communities are to the 
coastline of the beach. Pictured is the western side of the island touching the 
Caribbean Sea. Communities will have to decide either to continue living in areas 
that are exposed to the threats of natural hazards or move. Source: Author 
 
“You will hear fancy words. We love to sound pretty. We cannot stand 
to what we preach.” 
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Photograph 12 – This image shows a cruise ship docked in Roseau on January 28, 2018. The German 
boat Mein Schiff 3 was the first tourists’ ship to arrive on the island after Hurricane Maria in 2017. Its 
arrival was fully anticipated by many, especially the Tourism sector. Source: Author 
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5 Chapter Five: Conclusion 
Communication efforts were proven to be difficult before and during the event. 
Participants’ medium of choice to get updates on upcoming storms was local radio and 
the Weather Channel. Participants agreed that local radio personnel was usually the ones 
to relay messages of official meteorological information. They also looked to social 
media through cellphones and mobile tablets to obtain and spread messages to others. 
About half the participants felt that information about the storm was given to the public 
in a timely matter thus allowing enough time to prepare. The rest did not believe the 
information was accurate or timely. Four out of 15 believed that other forms of 
communication were better than the norm, such as air sirens or SMS messages from 
telecommunication providers. Complacency toward regular exposure to hurricanes within 
June through November was blamed as a reason for inadequate preparedness of the 
island. The fact that Maria’s course was strengthening and setting a direct path for the 
island at the beginning of the week was also blamed. 
All the participants named one agency as the lead agency: The Office of Disaster 
Management (ODM). They said their primary responsibility is to coordinate the response 
and recovery efforts. It concurred that the office of the Prime Minister (PM) was more 
visible than the ODM during and after the hurricane. They believe that leadership and the 
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ability to allocate resources are an essential quality for the lead agency in disaster 
situations and that it is possible some community members possess that same quality.  
A majority of the participants said they learned hurricane mitigative and survival 
techniques from family members from a past tropical storm. They concurred that there 
were no official drills in primary or secondary school. Some survived the catastrophe of 
Hurricane David in 1979 and used acquired lessons and knowledge from that experience 
towards this hurricane. Participants said that Hurricane Maria was most likely the first of 
its kind to be experienced by a large percentage of the younger population. They noted 
that reconstruction of the island after David would be more different than Maria’s 
because of storm characteristics and community value differences. They expressed that a 
mix of local community knowledge with new technology and information about response 
and recovery was best for infusing resilience into the island. 
All participants said that looting is a normal post-disaster reaction. The most 
common items looted are usually food, water, clothing, and shelter materials. Participants 
revealed that people began stealing and fighting over other items, such as electronics, 
from stores that had survived the hurricane. The week-long burglary of businesses from 
the country’s capital of Roseau was said to have tremendous socioeconomic impacts. 
Participants believed that businesses would never reopen, leaving many people 
unemployed after reconstruction. They expressed that strong kinship of communities and 
trust in others were destroyed. As the previous section explained, many of the younger 
populations had never seen a disaster of this magnitude. Some participants believed that it 
was mostly this younger generation that had partaken in this reckless behavior. All 
participants understood looting as younger generations acting on their grievances toward 
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socioeconomic injustices imposed on them by the government. They also expressed that 
limitations of law enforcement could not control the situation appropriately. 
    Various groups were named as having difficulty to becoming resilient: the 
unemployed, displaced, aging, and children. Men and the working poor were two groups 
specifically mentioned. Every single person interviewed understood that resilience was 
about self-preparedness in the sense that they can overcome trauma and disasters. Eight 
participants realized that it meant fixing problems within society: fixing the political 
structures in place, refocusing livelihood towards agriculture, putting the land first, etc. 
Some participants still felt as though fixing the economy was the best method for 
resiliency. They considered agriculture and tourism the most important sectors to get 
things back to normalcy. Overall, they felt like they would support any measures to 
continue resiliency efforts in Dominica after Hurricane Maria.  
My research opened up a channel to a multitude of opportunities to study SIDS, 
island vulnerability, climate change, and sustainable development. The next step of this 
research would be to recommend policies for individuals, businesses, governments, and 
nongovernment organizations that can reduce risks from natural hazards. This study can 
be extended into finding, collecting and archiving more traditional survival techniques 
embedded in communities and generations, such as stories and folklore. Another step to 
this research can be a study that looks into the total impacts of increased amounts of 
rainfall on islands with large percentages of rainforest ecosystems.  
To conclude, a significant amount of factors challenged how well the island of 
Dominica can respond and recover from this natural disaster. It is visible that the 
Government of Dominica has a known protocol for island response to natural hazards and 
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disasters. The National Emergency Planning Organization’s National Disaster Plan of 
2001 is a published disaster plan. When transferring these plans into reality, however, it 
appears that there can be a multitude of problems that decrease success.   
The framework created for these emergency plans is a top-down policy. The 
actions listed in the plan are to task responsibilities assigned to specific government 
officials, secretaries, and offices. Based on the interviews with the 15 participants, there 
is a potential for community-based information and knowledge to be integrated into the 
national disaster plans. The participants survived Hurricane Maria by following the 
advice of the government and emergency management officials as well as using past 
experiences to protect themselves during the storm. This finding suggests it is beneficial 
to use a mixture of both local community knowledge and advice from top officials. Thus, 
a collaboration between internal island specialists within communities and external 
researchers can maximize the potential of creating a bank of past, current, and future 
natural hazard reduction techniques for island communities. Such a collaboration would 
be satisfying the proponents of climate justice for SIDS.  
Furthermore, the top-down protocol framework has caused participants to indicate 
that there is strong political partisanship within society. Whether general policies of 
politically influential leaders strengthen partisanship or not was an inquiry of this study. 
What this study inquired was about the abilities of key leaders of SIDS to govern during 
disasters. What was revealed is that leaders are in positions to create hesitation and 
ambivalence of community members, which affected natural hazard awareness and 
response to hurricanes. The fact that there is any mistrust of government officials, 
emergency managers, police force, and information from administrative officials is 
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problematic. In combination with managing risk, all leaders of the country should have 
the ability to transform the attitudes of the islanders so that they feel they can survive 
potential forthcoming disasters.  
In contrast, it is not acceptable for leaders to infer that the Government is the end-
all to surviving natural hazards. In the case of Dominica and Hurricane Maria, people 
waited for the Government to tell them what to do and give them resources pre- and post-
storm. It should be recognized that there is a difference between governance and 
government.  “Governance refers to actions, processes, and systems creating, evolving, 
and monitoring rules and regulations by which people function within society. 
Government refers to the bodies that are charged with formalizing and enforcing 
governance” (Kelman, 2015).  It is imperative that the island’s individuals understand the 
distinction.  
This belief that government should freely give resources is called handout 
mentality (Ambang, 2018). Handout mentality occurs when political organizations do 
whatever they can to please the majority of people who have pledged allegiance to their 
party. Once in power, a political administration’s first order of business is to fulfill 
election promises. Most political leaders do this by giving free handouts of resources to 
their voters. Distributing supplies to some communities and citizens marginalizes others. 
In the minds of the others, it is unfair for a newly elected government to give out 
resources to constituents. As implied by the participants of this study, this causes 
frustration and rage in those who have this mentality. In the case of Dominica, the youth 
are most susceptible to this way of thinking and tried to correct it by taking what was not 
given to them but seen given to others. The act of stealing items after the storm was then 
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enshrouded by the natural action of looting post-disaster. Overall, it led to minimal 
preparedness and self-governance of particular individuals during the event of Hurricane 
Maria. 
In the case of awareness, individuals of SIDS must not become complacent, 
especially since climate change is going to produce storms of higher magnitudes and 
frequencies. The experiences of Dominicans during Hurricane Maria should not be 
forgotten. The participants of the study believe experiences will not be overlooked. 
However, searching for lessons learned 30 years ago after Hurricane David during this 
study attested the potential for this to happen. It must be recognized that generations will 
always be exposed to changes in society, which may cause loss of lessons, values, 
traditions, and knowledge as time goes on. It is important to archive them in history 
books so that they can always be used as a reference. It is even better to instill those 
lessons within in policies or laws and enforce them so that they are obeyed and followed.  
Lastly, the island of Dominica and all SIDS should recognize that preparedness is 
cyclic. Shortfalls of a plan should continually be assessed after training, simulations, and 
exercises. The individuals, officials, and businesses of Dominica should not take 
preparedness as a linear progression. Hazards are not limited to happening one at a time, 
where a particular step can be made to mitigate it, and then move on to respond to 
another. They can occur at the same time, in different forms, and preparedness is about 
being able to respond to all of it. When it comes to survival to natural disasters, excuses 
are intolerable. Preparing oneself for unknown difficulties is challenging, but resilience is 
how well we can return to normal after going through those difficulties.  To have the 
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capacity to do so means learning from mistakes. My research displays those mistakes and 
displays them as the first step to reaching sustainability in communities. 
 
“We have info…but don’t use it.” 
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Informed Consent 
Principal Investigator: Keanna N Julien 
Title of Project: Protocol, awareness, and preparedness evaluation of Dominica during Hurricane 
Maria: SIDS’ challenges to resiliency and adaptation to climate change 
Purpose of the Study 
You are invited to participate in a research study of Dominica during Hurricane Maria. I hope to 
learn about issues of emergency management and governance during this hydro-meteorological 
event for small island developing states that must adapt to climate change. You were selected as 
a possible participant in this study because you lived on the island at the time of the event. You 
must be over the age of 18 and have been living on the island for at least 4 to 12 months before 
September 19th, 2017 to participate. There are approximately 20 subjects expected to be 
involved in the study. 
Description of Study Procedures 
If you decide to participate, I will conduct one interview with you over the phone, which should 
take about 25 minutes to one hour. The interview will be recorded with a device used for 
recollection and analysis later. You will have to relive or recollect actions during a particularly 
stressful and/ or terrifying event which may disrupt your peace of mind or state of relaxation. This 
discomfort will be mitigated by keeping the thought of recollection short, under one-minute long. 
You are free to skip any questions that you are not comfortable with responding to.  
Potential Risks 
There is no more than minimal risk involved in this study. Although there are no foreseeable risks 
involved in the study, you may skip any questions you may feel uncomfortable with and/or 
withdraw from the study at any time. 
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Potential Benefits 
There are no direct benefits to participating in this study. I cannot and do not guarantee or 
promise that you will receive any direct benefits from this study. 
Alternative Procedures 
There are no known alternative procedures. The only alternative is not to participate. 
Confidentiality and Access to Records 
Your name will not appear in this study. There will be generalized identifiers used. The records of 
this study and recordings will be kept for three years in audio format in a password protected 
online drive. This drive is not cloud-based. After three years the records from this study will be 
destroyed. The research will remain confidential unless we are required by New York State Law 
to report harm to yourself or your children. 
Voluntary Nature and Withdrawal 
Your decision whether or not to participate will not affect your relations with the investigators, 
Binghamton University. Your participation is completely voluntary. If you decide to participate, you 
are free to withdraw your consent and to discontinue participation at any time without any penalty.  
Any significant new findings developed during the research that may affect your willingness to 
continue participation will be provided to you promptly. 
Questions and Contact Information 
Before you sign the form, please ask questions on any aspect of the study that is unclear to you. 
If you have any additional questions, concerns, or complaints or wish to report a research-related 
problem later, Keanna N Julien at kjulien1@binghamton.edu will be happy to answer them. If at 
any time you have questions concerning your rights as a research subject, or you have questions, 
concerns, or complaints about the research, you may contact Binghamton University's Human 
Subjects Research Review Committee (HSRRC) at (607) 777-3818 or hsrrc@binghamton.edu. 
Do I have your permission to record the interview? 
Date ____________  
Consent to record given: YES/ NO 
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YOU ARE MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO PARTICIPATE. YOUR SIGNATURE 
INDICATES THAT YOU HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE HAVING READ THE 
INFORMATION PROVIDED ABOVE. 
 
Date ____________  
Verbal consent given: YES/ NO  
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Keanna N Julien 
Interview Script 
STUDY TITLE: Protocol, awareness, and preparedness evaluation of Dominica during 
Hurricane Maria: SIDS’ challenges to resiliency and adaption to climate change 
 
Do I have your permission to record the interview? 
SUMMARY OF ACCOUNTS 
1. Please briefly describe your account of Hurricane Maria. Please include when 
and how you first heard of the storm, your immediate plan or thought of action/s, 
and then a summarized description of the conditions after the storm.  
COMMUNICATION 
2. Can you go more into depth about the alert system? How is it customarily 
communicated that there will be a natural event in which you should prepare a 
plan of action for safety and resiliency? Who usually informs the public? 
2a. How do you feel towards the warnings? How did you feel towards the alarm 
about the upcoming storm of Maria? Why did you respond this way? 
2b. Do you think that the information given to you is adequate? Would you like to 
receive more information, or receive that information in another way? 
2c. What form/s of communication about natural events and disaster 
preparedness would you believe be the most effective, meaning most of the 
public gets a clear message promptly? Why? 
COMMUNITY versus INSTITUTIONS 
3. What or who is in charge during a natural event? Can you name them, or 
generalize what they do? 
3a. What or who took the lead during Hurricane Maria? Why do you think that is? 
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3b. What kind of qualities and resources should the lead person or group have in 
this situation? Why are those qualities and resources essential? 
3c. Do you think members of your community possess those qualities? Do you 
think they could do the same job, maybe even better? Why/Why not? 
COMMUNITY KNOWLEDGE 
4. How did you learn what to do during a hurricane/flooding/landslide? Are there 
drills in school or the community? Did someone in your family teach you what to 
do?  
èHow many natural disasters have you lived through?  
4*. Hurricane David was in late August of 1979. How was that experience? 
4a*. What are some striking differences between David and Maria?  
4b*. How was reconstruction after David? What was new? (houses, buildings, 
government)? 
4c*. What were some lessons learned from Hurricane David? 
4d. Do you think people used those lessons learned from previous natural 
disasters? 
SECURITY 
5. I heard looting was a significant problem after the storm. Why do you think 
people began to loot? 
5a. In what ways do you think that looting will have a long-lasting impact on the 
resiliency of the country? Economic, social-wellbeing, portfolio for investors? 
5b. What actions do you think could have prevented it? 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 
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6. Do you think there is groups or individuals in the community that are forgotten? 
In what ways do you think they are being left out? 
6a. How should they be included in the resiliency plan? 
RESILIENCY 
7. In your own words, define resilience. 
7a. What would be resiliency, economically? 
7b. What would resiliency, social? 
7c. What would be resiliency, environmentally? 
7d. Is one of those scenarios more critical than the other? Why or why not? 
7e. What do you believe is the number one thing holding back from a quick and 
resilient future? 
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